The State of Utah v. John Charles Cloud : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1991
The State of Utah v. John Charles Cloud : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
F. John Hill; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorney for Appellant.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; J. Stephen Mikita; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Cloud, No. 919884.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3965
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
JOHN CHARLES CLOUD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No>fL9884 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION OF SECOND DEGREE HOMICIDE, 
A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-5-203 (SUPP. 1983), IN THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE HOMER F. 
WILKINSON, PRESIDING. 
UTAHSUS^HHQMRXlT 
BftlfeF 
UT/TAH 
D<DOCUMENT 
K K F U 
4545.9 
.s:s9 
DOOCKETNO ? iqwi. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
J. STEPHEN MIKITA 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
F. JOHN HILL 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
| ft Isns JUBM \-X& 
JUN181985 
:!crk, Sup'ome Cowl, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
JOHN CHARLES CLOUD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19884 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION OF SECOND DEGREE HOMICIDE, 
A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-5-203 (SUPP. 1983), IN THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE HOMER F. 
WILKINSON, PRESIDING. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
J. STEPHEN MIKITA 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
F. JOHN HILL 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah P: 1 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES i 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 9 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION BY ADMITTING PHOTOS 
OF THE VICTIM INTO EVIDENCE 10 
POINT II THE JURY WAS FULLY AND ACCURATELY 
INSTRUCTED ON THE LESSER-INCLUDED 
OFFENSE OF MANSLAUGHTER 14 
POINT III THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE JURY'S VERDICT 16 
POINT IV DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY 
ERROR, THEREFORE, THERE IS NO 
CUMULATIVE ERROR 19 
CONCLUSION 19 
ADDENDUM 21 
TABLE QF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
State v. Brooks. Utah, 638 P.2d 537 (1981) 15 
State v. Garcia. Utah, 663 P.2d 60 (1983) 11, 
13 
State v. Gilbert. N.M., 671 P.2d 646 1983) 12 
State v. Howell. Utah, 649 P.2d 91 (1982) 17 
State v. Johnson. 25 Utah 2d 46, 475 P.2d 543 (1970) . 12 
State v. Kerekes. Utah, 622, P.2d 1161 (1980) . . . . 19 
State v. McCardell. Utah, 652 P.2d 942 (1982) . . . . 17 
State v. Malmrose. Utah, 649 P.2d 56 (1982) 14 
State Vt Murphy, Utah, 674 p.2d 1220 (1983) 17 
State v. Pierre. Utah, 572 P.2d 1338 (1977) 13 
State v. Poe. 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P.2d 512 (1978) . . 13 
State v. Romero. Utah, 554 P.2d 216 (1976) 17 
State v. Ruben. Utah, 663 P.2d 445 (1983) 15 
State v. Wells. Utah, 603 P.2d 810 (1979) 12 
STATUTES CITED 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1983) 1 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-205 (1978) 16 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-19 (c) (Supp. 1982) 14 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-42-1 (1953, as amended -
repealed 1980) 12 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 61 12 
-ii-
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTEP QN APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by 
admitting photographs of the deceased into evidence? 
2. Was the jury completely and accurately instructed 
that it could consider the lesser included offense of 
manslaughter during its deliberations? 
3. Was the evidence presented by the State sufficient 
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted with 
the mental state required to convict him of second degree 
homicide? 
-iii-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
- v -
JOHN CHARLES CLOUD, 
Defendant-Appellant* 
Case No. 19884 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, John Charles Cloud, was charged with second 
degree homicide, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1983). 
Defendant was convicted of the charged offense, in a 
jury trial held March 5-8, 1984, in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding. Defendant was sentenced by Judge 
Wilkinson on March 27, 1984, to an indeterminate term of five 
years to life at the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At approximately 7:30 Monday morning, May 23, 1983, 
Nyla Johnson was found dead, lying in a pool of blood, on the 
bathroom floor of the apartment that she shared with defendant, 
John Charles Cloud (T. 56, 95, 204)A An autopsy that some 
afternoon established the cause of death as "hemorrhage due to 
multiple stab wounds" (T. 295). 
1 Transcript citations refer to the typed numbers in the lower, 
right-hand corner of each page rather than the stamped numbers at 
approximately the same location. 
Jane Niskala, a friend of the victimf made the initial 
discovery of the body when she stopped to pick up Ms. Johnson for 
work. When she entered the apartment, Ms. Niskala discovered a 
partially covered, white male asleep in the master bedroom and 
the body of her friend lying face down on the bathroom floor (T. 
51r 53-56, 60, 64-66). Ms. Niskala became frightened and fled. 
Upon arriving at work, Ms. Niskala telephoned the victim's ex-
husband, McKay Johnson, told him that something terrible had 
happened, and urged him to go immediately to the victim's 
apartment (T. 58). 
The apartment door was open when Johnson arrived and so 
he entered. Defendant was in the hall and appeared to be 
dressing. He did not respond to Johnson's inquiries about what 
had happened. Johnson then walked past defendant to the bathroom 
where he discovered the victim. He immediately phoned the police 
(T. 94-95, 99-100). 
While they waited for the police, Johnson again asked 
defendant what had happened. Defendant indicated that he had not 
been home that night and had returned to the apartment just 
moments before Johnson arrived. Defendant explained to Johnson 
that when he returned to the apartment he was attacked by a black 
man wielding a large knife. Defendant struggled with the 
intruder, but he escaped. Defendant then showed Johnson several 
superficial cuts on his hands allegedly received during the 
struggle (T. 97-101). Defendant made no response to Mr. 
Johnson's accusation that defendant was lying and appeared calm, 
in control and able to converse without difficulty (T. 97). 
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Defendant repeated the story of the black intruder to a 
paramedic and at least three police officers (T. 106-107, 129, 
133, 157, 168). According to defendant, he left the apartment 
Sunday evening and went to a local lounge for a drink. Sunday 
evening was the last time he saw the victim alive. Defendant 
returned to the apartment complex at approximately 9:00 p.m. 
Sunday evening, but elected to sleep in the pick-up truck in the 
parking lot instead of going up to the apartment (T. 156-157). 
When he did return to the apartment Monday morning, defendant was 
attacked by the black intruder. The next thing defendant claimed 
to remember was searching for Ms. Johnson and finding her dead on 
the bathroom floor (T. 157-158). Defendant denied being present 
when Ms. Niskala discovered the body and claimed that he was not 
the person she saw in bed (T. 158-159). 
During the police interrogation with Detective 
Beckstead, defendant denied any personal problems between himself 
and the victim (T. 139, 167) . He also said that he was not 
intoxicated, having had only two beers the previous evening and 
part of a beer that morning. Defendant specifically stated that 
he was sober Sunday evening and at the police interview (T. 165-
166). The investigating officers testified that defendant 
appeared calm and at ease during both the investigation at the 
apartment and subsequent police interviews (T. 133, 169). 
The evidence at the scene did not support the 
defendants story of an intruder. At the apartment, the 
paramedics and police determined that Ms. Johnson had been dead 
for several hours, clearly inconsistent with the story of a 
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recent attack (T. 126, 206). This conclusion was confirmed by 
the medical examiner who established the time of death between 
9:00 p.m. and 1:30 a.m.f a minimum of six hours before the 
victim's body was discovered (T. 293). Furthermore, traces of 
blood were found throughout the apartment, all of it dried except 
for the large amount directly beneath the body (T. 126, 129f 
204). The cuts on defendant's handsr allegedly received during 
the altercation with the intruderf were not fresh; the blood was 
dry and the skin at the edges was drying out (T. 105, 107-108, 
133). 
Further investigation at the apartment revealed no 
trace of an intruder. A large butcher knife was found in the 
kitchen with traces of blood from both the victim and defendant 
(R. 233-234). Blood stains analyzed from various locations in 
the apartment were consistent with either the victim1s or 
defendant's blood types (T. 236-244f 246-249). A physical search 
of the defendant revealed traces of blood on his ankles, heels 
and between his toes although defendant told the police he was 
wearing shoes when he returned to the apartment that morning. 
There were also traces of blood on defendant's underwear and 
trousers. The police observed blood spattering on defendant's 
left ear as well as fresh bruises and scratches on his chest and 
arms (T. 161-164). A neighbor reported hearing an argument in 
the victim's apartment at approximately 7:30 Sunday evening (T. 
148-150). None of the neighbors questioned observed an unknown 
black man in the area. 
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At trial, defendant recanted his story of an intruder 
and admitted that he killed Nyla Johnson. His defense was that 
he acted under extreme mental or emotional distress exacerbated, 
or perhaps caused, by his long history of alcoholism. 
Defendant first arrived in Salt Lake in July 1982. He 
enrolled in an alcohol treatment program which had a positive but 
short-lived effect (T. 357-358). He met Nyla Johnson at a local 
club, the Sojourner, in March 1983. Within one week of meeting 
Ms. Johnson, defendant was drinking again (T. 359-360). By early 
April, defendant was back at the V.A. Hospital seeking further 
treatment. Defendant's relationship with Ms. Johnson had become 
very close and she proved to be a disruptive influence on his 
treatment program. Within two weeks defendant left the treatment 
program and moved in with Ms. Johnson. They made tentative plans 
to marry. Both were drinking heavily during this period (T. 361-
364, 405). 
During these few weeks with Ms. Johnson, defendant 
became increasingly worried about his drinking because he was 
anxious for the relationship to succeed and his drinking had 
caused the breakup of his first marriage. He told Ms. Johnson 
that he was going to Denver and then checked himself into the 
alcohol rehabilitation program at Odyssey House in Salt Lake. 
Defendant did not communicate with Ms. Johnson for three weeks 
because he feared that she might interfere with his treatment (T. 
365-366, 411). 
Saturday morning, May 21, 1983, defendant checked out 
of Odyssey House prior to receiving any treatment, telephoned Ms. 
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Johnson, told her where he had been and asked her to pick him up. 
Johnson told him she was busy and to call back later. They 
finally arranged for her to pick defendant up later Saturday 
afternoon (T. 369-370, 407-409). According to defendants own 
testimony, the remainder of the weekend, prior to the homicide, 
was difficult and confusing. 
The first problem arose when Ms. Johnson picked 
defendant up and took an unfamiliar route home. She refused to 
explain her actions telling defendant that she was doing some 
detective work for a friend and he should not ask about it (T. 
370-371, 407-408). Defendant next became upset when they arrived 
at the apartment and he found vodka, bourbon and beer. He 
concluded that the victim must have purchased the liquor after he 
told her that he had been in a treatment program and, therefore, 
she was not supportive of his efforts to overcome his drinking 
problem (T. 371-372, 409-410). They went to the Sojourner later 
that Saturday night. According to defendant's testimony, he did 
not drink at all but the victim was drinking quite heavily (T. 
373-374, 413). 
Prior to going to the club, defendant and Ms. Johnson 
discussed their marriage plans and he was optimistic that they 
had reached an understanding (T. 372, 413). Unfortunately, on 
Sunday, May 22, everything began to fall apart. Ms. Johnson left 
the apartment twice without telling defendant where she was 
going. Defendant began to suspect that Ms. Johnson was seeing 
someone else (T. 375-377, 413-415). He began to drink (T. 378, 
418). Later that day, Ms. Johnson told defendant that she had a 
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a number of superficial stab wounds, bruisesf and scratches on 
the body (T. 285-288). The hands had nine lacerations, at least 
one which was extremely deepf described as defensive wounds (T. 
205, 288-289). Blood tests on the victim were negative both as 
to alcohol and drugs (T. 299). 
The defense introduced evidence that the victim had in 
fact been dating another man while the defendant was at Odyssey 
House and did some detective work for him (T. 342, 344-345). Bob 
Stone, a friend of defendant also testified that he received a 
phone call Sunday evening from defendant who wanted to talk about 
problems defendant was having with his girlfriend. Defendant was 
described as more unhappy than angry. Stone, however, refused to 
meet with defendant because defendant had been drinking (T. 332-
334) . 
Dr. Louis G. Moench, a psychiatrist, also testified for 
defendant. Dr. Moench interviewed defendant for two hours, five 
months after the homicide, at the request of the defense attorney 
to see if defendants state of mind at the time of the homicide 
could be determined (T. 465-466). Based on this interview Dr. 
Moench concluded that although defendant was not suffering from a 
mental illness (T. 468), he was acting under extreme emotional 
turmoil or stress at the time of the homicide. Dr. Moench based 
his opinion on defendant's previous history of impulsive 
behavior, his continuing distress over his divorce, his 
alcoholism, and his emotional investment in a relationship which 
was falling apart (T. 480-481). 
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION BY ADMITTING PHOTOS OF 
THE VICTIM INTO EVIDENCE. 
Defendant challenges the admission of five photographs 
of the victim as lacking in probative value and extremely 
prejudicial. Defendant asserts that since he did not deny the 
killing, claiming that he acted under extreme emotional distress, 
the only purpose served by the photos was to arouse the jury's 
prejudice against him. The following pictures are at issue: 
(1) Exhibit #6 shows a picture of the scene and the body as it 
was actually discovered. 
(2) Exhibit #15 is also a picture of the scene, however, the 
victim has been rolled over onto her back. The photo shows 
the major wound area, the amount of blood loss, and the 
degree of blood coagulation which provides an indication of 
time of death. 
(3) Exhibit #40 is an autopsy photo of the victim's hand showing 
what was characterized as a defensive wound. 
(4) Exhibit #41 is also an autopsy photo, this one showing a 
severe injury to the right hand also described as a 
defensive wound. 
(5) Exhibit #42 is an autopsy photo showing a wound to the left 
armpit. 
All other photos showing any portion of the victim's body were 
denied admission (T. 313-314). 
The admission of these and other photographs was argued 
at several points throughout the trial. Initially, the defense 
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evidentiary va] ue" is established by considering whether the 
photos convey only information which can be readily and 
accurately conveyed to the jury by potentially less prejudicial 
means. Id. 
In Garcia, this Court also said, "the responsibility of 
weighing relevance against prejudice is that of the trial judgef 
and his decision will not be overturned by this Court uless it is 
shown to be an abuse of discretion." 1£. (citations omitted) 
See also State v. Johnson, 25 Utah 2d 46, 475 P.2d 543 (1970). 
After hearing the State's case-in-chief, Judge Wilkinson ruled 
that these particular photographs were relevant to convey 
information not adequately presented to the fact finder through 
oral testimony and the use of diagrams. "Photographs are 
relevant and admissible for the purpose of clarifying and 
illustrating testimony." State v. Gilbert, N.M., 671 P.2d 646f 
647 (1983). Photographs probative of essential facts are 
admissible even though they may be cumulative of other evidence, 
fiancia, 663 P.2d at 63; JohnsonP 475 P.2d at 546. 
Even a determination by this Court that it was an abuse 
of discretion to admit the photos would not by itself be 
sufficient to establish reversible error. In State v. Wells, 
Utah, 603 P.2d 810 (1979), the Court found the admission of 
certain photos to be superfluous and without evidentiary value. 
Nevertheless, it was not reversible error under the requirements 
of UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-42-1 (1953, as amended—repealed, 1980). 
Cf. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61 (1953, as amended). 
This Court does not interfere with a jury 
vedict because of error or irregularity 
unless upon review of the entire record it is 
determined that prejudice has occurred in a 
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substantial manner, i.e,f the error must be 
such that there exists a reasonable 
probability or likelihood that there would 
have been a result more favorable to the 
defendent in the absence of error. Quoting 
State v, Pierre. Utah, 572 P.2d 1338, 1352 
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a c t e d iiiiiiiii i e x t r e m e emot iona l d i s t r e s s . The mere f a c t t h a t t h e 
j u r y r e j e c t e d h i s d e f e n s e does n o t h i n q In e s t a b l i s h tha t if d id so 
a i"- «:i ire ' " l i l t I |HI< | i n l i i t e n g e n d t i e d dy n t iiiini Urn cha 1J on IJI L! 
photographs. 
Sta i f i .Y*. .EQCP 21 Utah 2d 111 1 4 I I I , <'d Ml I'MM.l 
remain,. I In mi l , litniii c n ie c a s e t h e Coin I has r e v e r s e d l m e i r o n in 
a d m i t t i n g p h o t o g r a p h s , In I'IJL , Mack and w h i t e p h o t o s were 
admi 1 t t i l I n .' In iw I tin i| i i i i In il v> i i iml i in I II I in i i • w i I m I i inn n i 
c o n c e r n i n g t h e s e wounds, S u b s e q u e n t l y , c o l o r a u t o p s y photob t h a t 
added n o t h i n g by way of t i a r i f i c a t ion oi a d d i t i o n a l e v i d e n c e were 
a I! n» m i l l i \j\ i i m IMI I , 111 IA j IHJUI i MM! I I I HI I I " i 11 i 
In t h e in t i t an t c a s e , t h e t r i a l coin t found tho a d m i t t e d 
p h o t o g r a p h s p r o b a t i v e on thf i(o.iit ot morns U M , h e l p f u l in 
c I  i .in i i I \ 11 in < i ml J i 11111 < i I i > .. in 11 11 II I I  I in in in i I i I  I  in 11«I i 11 i .' i I 11 i t . J t m i 1 y 
u n c l e a r o r i n m l i q u a t e t e s t i m o n y . T h e t i i a l c o u i t . d i d n o t a b u s e 
i t s d i s c r e t i o n in a d m i t t i n q t h e p h o t o q r a p h s under t h e g u i d e l i n e s 
e s t abJ i iitied 111 bar c i a „ MM I', -.11J n I. b 4 . 
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POINT II 
THE JURY WAS FULLY AND ACCURATELY 
INSTRUCTED ON THE LESSER-INCLUDED 
OFFENSE OF MANSLAUGHTER. 
Defendant next claims that the jury was inadequately 
instructed on manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of second-
degree homicide because of the trial court's refusal to give two 
of defendant's requested jury instructions. A review of both the 
requested and given instructions demonstrates this claim to be 
entirely without merit. 
Defendant first challenges the failure to give his 
requested Instruction No. 21 [Appendix A] which he characterizes 
as a "transitional" instruction bridging the gap between second-
degree homicide and manslaughter. Defendant, however, failed to 
take exception to the court's decision not to give this 
instruction at trial. Thus, he is precluded from challenging this 
particular instruction on appeal unless necessary to avoid mani-
fest injustice. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-19(c)(Supp. 1982), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure; State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56 
(1982). At trial, defendant excepted to the refusal to give 
Requested Instructions No. 7 and 24 [Appendix A; R. 558]. He 
should not now be allowed to expand his original objection by 
challenging a different instruction on appeal. In any event, a 
review of the instructions given clearly demonstrates that the 
jury was fully and accurately instructed and that affirmance of 
defendant's conviction on this ground will not result in "manifest 
injustice". 
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Dei ei mi I ii ml u I 11 i I .J J in i i i 111 i in I In \U 11 i i I i I I M | lie >l i il 
I n s t r u c t i o n No, 24 [Appendix HI hi e s sence r t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n 
t o l l s the iiiir'i twnn thimi Mill if the ijiiiir lii i doubt about the 
degiet ul I lit nul 1 i m »i', ill iiiiii I i n n . j i l MM I In llnwi t deyiei. , in! 
(2) nans laughte r i s a l e s s e r inc luded offense of second degree 
homicide, 11 iei i uu^ - - «: t i o n s qiven LU trie .. a 
whole,.- ii Il: i s apparent : . ^ t i, . , / wa^ ad^quai . . . ; : u c t u •" 
both i s s u e s , therefor*7 , menial l ,iefe,.d:mt i t r u c t i o n s - ;~ 
€ 
Tt in well s e t t l e d t h a t whnn t h i s Court reviews the 
s u f f i c i e n c y of a p a r t i c u l a r inry i ns t rueM on
 r i t <}••--- - t h e 
C i I I I 1 L1 >" I I I 1 II I I II I Il  II II > * I II II II I I l ! I II II I I II II I \hl i i I I | I II II ,
 t v„ , x. . L O o k S , 
Utah r 6jy P,2d 53 f" • i-1 " "119811, Au noted .in S t a t e v . Ruben. Utah, 
€63 P. 2d 44 51 449 lIMiiii "an i n s t r u c t i o n should not be cons idered 
i i I i s o l a t i o n in o i d u lu p i tu l i ca te a cluiui ni' e r r o r upon i 1 , I it 
t he i n s t r u c t i o n must be read and considered as a connected whole,11 
I n s t r i ic t i ons N :: • 1 I1 *' \t\ ppf lull i > III11! 11 i I I i i 1 c .iiiiii: 
i n s t r u c t i o n s givei i oi :i iirianslaughtei » Deieridant c i t e s I n s t r u c t i o n 
No. ] 8 i n par t i c u l a r as manda t i nq a g u i l t y v e r d i c t on second-
degr ee he mi cI de il  i I t:h• s all!: • s e n o e 11 i I 11 i i t «i | ui ut i- < 1 i 111 I i 11r t i 1111 
(Appe] l a n t ' s b r i e f , p . ] 3 ) In t d c t , defendant to taJ ]y ignores 
the f ina l sentence ' * i n s t ruc t ion : 
However . u*^ State has fa i led to yi • : 
any one or more of such elements beyona 
a reasonable doubt then you cannot find 
John Charles Cloud guilty of the offense 
of criminal homicide, murder in the second 
degree, and should then consider the 
lesser Included offense of manslaughter. 
- i r > -
Instruction No, 19 also tells the jury that manslaughter is a 
lesser-included offense of homicide. 
Instruction No. 20 defines the elements of manslaughter 
as outlined in UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-205 (1978). No. 21 instructs 
the jury on the meaning of extreme mental or emotional distubance 
and explains the standard used in determining whether there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse for such disturbance. Finallyr 
No. 22 outlines what the State must prove to establish 
manslaughter and that if the elements are not proved the defendant 
should be acquitted. Moreover/ the jury is twice told in this 
single instruction that manslaughter is a lesser-included offense 
of the charged offense. 
In sum, the requested instructions that the court did 
not give were merely repetitive of principles enunciated in the 
given instructions. When read as a whole, the instructions that 
were given correctly informed the jury of the conditions which 
could be considered to find defendant guilty of manslaughter 
rather than second-degree homicide. Therefore, the court did not 
err in failing to give defendants requested instructions. 
2QINT III 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE JURYfS VERDICT. 
Defendant argues that the State presented insufficient 
evidence at trial from which the jury could have found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he had the mental state required for 
commission of the crime charged. This argument is also without 
merit. 
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When
 considering a c 1: 1 a 11 ei Ige tc • t:he suffIcIency oJ. Lhe 
evidence supporting o < onviction, this Court has applied the 
following standard of review: 
This Court will not lightly overturn the 
findings of a jury. We must view the 
evidence properly presented at trial in the 
light most favorable to the jury's verdict, 
and will only interefere when the evidence 
so lacking and insubstantial that: a 
reasonable man could not possibly have 
reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. 
We also view in a light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict those facts which can be 
reasonably inferred from the evidence 
presented to it 
iiLilfc1. V... . .Jicl^Liifil 1 - HI Ii 
o m i t t i Ill) . 
Thf r e f o r e r u n l e s s t h e n i r> a c l e a r o h o w m q of l u c k o i 
e v i d e n c e i n hi i i e » i i n , i t t u t d e f e n d a n t commit t o o t n e t i i r n c , i I IP 
t r i a l c o u r t ' s v e r d i c t « h n i i l d be u p h e l d , g e e S t a t e v . R o m e r o , 
U t a h , !">44 P . ? d ,'I d M O ' d i T i n . i> t r m iww ill I lit r ippf 11 H I • 
c o u r t V H W I I t i n e v i d e n c e a s i e c L t h a n whuI I > i e u e 1 u s i v e , Tht 
c o u r t m u s t t innJ t h a i T r e a s o n a b l e m i n d s w o u l d bavi e m t e i t a i n e d a 
rf ' r iForuili I i liniilil In I MI I I I in I I I in M I I in in I In I I ill i I i^ t i I J . L I L L 
v , H o w e l l . I ill | I'll | i,| i) | I J 9 8 ; l . 
Illii I i d e f e n d a n t a d m i t s t o k i l l i n g N y l a J o h n s o n , lie 
<"' nil IV" i in i III!. f h i I I Illii ( i iii III i (11 i I III i I ,. ii| >] I ui I I In I I In 111 I I 
i n t e n t i o n a l l y OL k n o w i n g l y . T h i s i g n o r e s t w o w e l l - s e t t l e d 
p r i n c i p l e s o i l a w : i l l t h e t r i c i of f a e t i e no t o b l i g a t e d t o 
b e ] I e y Ei I  I t ' u u i i n e t inn > I  II H . J I I I I O I n I I n d e l t i i n l i j i i t i d L h i i t i n I I I 
that presented in opposition by the Sta t e , Howell , 644 p. 2d at 9 
and/ (2) intent In i omiuil a uixine "mi,1 D O inferred finm ilm 
ac t i o n s ol the detendant or from •: lie sui rounding ei i eunistanees," 
State v, Murphy, . .2d I220f i 223 (mn:\). 
_ 1 "7_ 
Defendant testified that he became suspicious that Ms. 
Johnson was involved with another man. They quarreledf he went to 
the kitchen, grabbed a knife and stabbed her numerous times. He 
now attempts to justify his crime by claiming that he did not know 
what he was doing due to heavy drinking. The jury need not accept 
defendant's self-serving explanations. In considering the 
totality of the evidencef e.g.f the defendant's ability to act 
purposefully in all other events that weekend as well as his 
attempts to cover-up by pinning the blame on an unknown assailant, 
the jury could reasonably have believed the defendant was lying 
when he claimed not to know what he was doing. 
Dr. Moench testified that defendant was acting under 
e- otional turmoil for which there was a reasonable explanation at 
i.ne time of the offense. The doctor specifically statedf howeverf 
that the did not think there was a reasonable excuse for the crime 
(T. 481). Although he described defendant as having poor impulse 
controlf low frustration tolerance and a paranoid personality-
type, the doctor also stated that many other alcohol abusers 
exhibit these same tendencies. Furthermore/ the doctor never gave 
an opinion on whether defendant understood what he was doing at 
the time or whether he was able to control his actions. 
Just as the jury need not believe every witnesses' 
story, it need not accept an expert's testimony. The jury is 
entitled to give the expert testimony any weight to which it deems 
that testimony entitled/ including rejecting the opinion in whole 
or in part. 
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D e f f i i u l r i n l 1 ii i in I ill i i mi in mi I in • ill 11 in i • mi in i L i M I i i " H | mi i n 
" i n c o n c l u s i v e " in " i n s u b s t a n t i a l " n a t u r e of t h e e v i d e n c e g i v i n g 
r i s e t o a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . S t a t e v> K e r e k e s . Utah, m . P.2d 1161 
(1980) Mi I Il I I II Il i ill Il t ' , , 1 a l i i II J « I n n 1 1 H i i l 1 h e • 
e v i d e n c e was so l a c k i n g m i n s u b s t a n t i a l t h a t a r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n 
cou ld • havp concludfiJ beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doub t Unit ricfendai it 
a nl i miihII I I , in I iiiiw i in|J , win1!! hi st abbt1 Jl Nyla J o h n s o n . 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABI .ISH A NY 
ERROR, THEREFORE, THERE IS NO 
CIJMIJI .ATIVE ERROR. 
enuLt 
error 
t h e r e 
Defer.de"it r.a , : 
. i n u n d a t i o n upon which 
* c u m u l a t i v e ei 
o g i c a l l y 
c d n i u i a l x v e 
i equesL i. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon t h e f o r e g o i ng, t h e S t a t e r e s p e c t f u l l y 
111" i \ 11 J i t t , :: af f i rm t h e j u r j ' s v e r d i c t . 
DATED t h i s / 2 " > < d a y of Jin :tef ] 985 . 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
2PHEN MIKITA 
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
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ADDENDUM 

INSTRUCTION NO. 
To warrant you i n c o n v i c t i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t , t h e e v i d e 
must: !. o your minds e x c l u d e e v e r v r,..^ •-, >n .»K :.. ^ v p o t h e s i s o t h e r 
thiil nl I In ;.«ujl( ill l In ilctViulai * .1 ?a^ j f qft^y-
e n t i r e c o n s i d e r a t e : i:;.i ;• >mparison :" n- t e - t i ^ u r i*\ * 
c a s e you L ea so ru r 
any reason^. , .„•» srrou^ 
should actw^_ :.i:i.. 
gxLlL 1 :' the defendant, 
•C 
^/ f 1**1 
/ 
iNr.TRur: M'MN MO 2 / 
When a homicide which W-J^«I '''-rTwi^ f h^ ^-irder the 
second d^r- < -
 (- a]_ 
or emotion-*, u.^curbance for whicr. ' ^er. i- 3 reasonable explanation 
then the offense constitutes manslaughter. 
/ :!' ' ^ 7 1 £ - ^ 
151 
INSTRUCTION NO ^ *"f 
a criminal homicide - . i-a^nabli- J^uh. ^s \. \S 
of rwo or more degrees * th i crime he is guilty, you must convict 
li i in i > t I hi.1 11 iwt's L tl * 
The crime o* . rimir-.i. homicid- Girder " ~e second 
degree - charged in * infurmaLiun . : - . neeessaii±y 
includes the lesser uilenso ^f ^rim; ... 1: lomicide - manslaughter. 
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APPENDIX B 
INSTRUCTION NO, /n 
r n l l f v o f tfu u t e n s e ;-f a • <r i •  • . H o m i c i d . - . - a i d e r - * rie S e c o n d 
L e g r e e , t h " f r a t e mu°^ ^ r , ^ ( J on.*h ^n,-j ^ - . w - - w I l e wf t h e following 
elements t ar sat". . * ~pa<?onable dLu. : 
;
 '.' " a r* ,r M i *, * *^  harles Cloud 
i ii i 1 , i v ; f H : * l 
r J '! J ii l e ^ u i ' MU C":Lni' r e i ->Ach a c t e i t h e r ; 
* - "' - * " » 
committed an ... : -a: . - dangerous * :•• life;
 Lin i 
• i * e 
of Utah. 
r ' r u . S f . * n - * f • r w ^ d p a c h <PK1 • **-vv u-v- . f r^ j ^Vreroing 
. • i- : . . : • n 
; vi-ar di,: \ * " . * ! .r i n e s Ll-a : r a i l t v ^* r he offense 
ui urun ;" i! Humicidt ' udei l* '*' • Fr--^3 r ' <?re^. . charged 
•IT) fVjp , *l t 'T1^0. ^~ 1 r><n *v-v7e17Pr" In . .,L I ». +"° nrn , , T^ 
:
 'v "• r^ m^ra- * 'a,' elements Devon I .; reasonable :i. ah* th*r 
1
 -^: i U-, Munier , Set% >nd Peeree. and shea: : t. •-. n)^si;icr 
tn^ lesser in^Iud^d offense of Manslaughter. 
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INSTRUCTION NO, n 
You 4-- i><-*y i •
 i:, _ ia£hte~ ' * lesser included 
offe^ : . *: \ i i- : i'hm :he offense .: ._, 
Mur d t-... " h •- s e c o n d degree. 
i^n 
A person commits manslaughter, a Second Degree Felony, 
if he; 
(a) Recklessly causes the death of another; or 
(b) Causes the death of another under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse. 
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INSTRUCTION NO, ^ 7 
In determining whether or not the defendant acted under 
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, you 
must consider all of the evidence and circumstances surrounding 
the homicide, and they must be viewed by you as the defendant 
saw them at the time of his acts; and further, you must consider 
whether or not there was a reasonable explanation or excuse for 
such disturbance. 
If you find that the defendant, John Charles Cloud, acted 
while under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional 
disturance, you must next determine whether or not there was a 
reasonable explanation or excuse for such disturbance. In making the 
determination whether there was a reasonable explanation or ex-
cuse, the standard to be applied is whether the explanation or 
excuse is reasonable to an ordinary person viewing the evidence 
and circumstances, at the time of the homicide, from defendant's 
standpoint. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ +-
you 
Before flBHHHB may find John Charles Cloud guilty of 
the offense of Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter, the State must 
prove each and every one of the following elements to your satisfaction 
and beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. That on or about May 23, 1983, John Charles Cloud 
unlawfully caused the death of Nyla Johnson; and 
2. That John Charles Cloud caused the death either 
(a) Recklessly; or 
(b) Under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse. 
3. That such acts occurred in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
If the State has proved each and every one of the foregoing 
elements to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt, then 
it is your duty to find John Charles Cloud guilty of the offense 
of Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter, a lesser and included offense 
of the Information. However, if the State has failed to prove 
any one or more of such elements beyond a reasonable doubt then 
you must find John Charles Cloud not guilty of the offense of 
Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter, a lesser and included offense 
of the Information. 
